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Lee and Song’s paper analyzes the effect of oil shocks on the Korean economy and examines the 
role of monetary policy in dealing with oil shocks. In doing this, they employ two analytical tools out 
of the standard macroeconomists’ toolbox, structural VAR and Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium model (DSGE). However, their analytical tools are particularly constrained in this case 
for two reasons. First, the Asian currency crisis in the late 1990s caused serious turmoil and 
significant structural changes for the Korean economy. Hence, in addition to dividing the sample 
around the Asian currency crisis, Lee and Song dropped the observations in 1998 and 1999. This 
limits the sample size for the post-Asian crisis period to less than forty observations of quarterly data. 
It is obviously a very small data set for an application of time-series techniques. 
 
Second, oil price movements in the 2000s exhibit large swings relative to the post-crisis sample 
period. Like Japan’s asset price bubble episode in the late 1980s, the existence of a large one-time 
fluctuation in asset prices often spoils sophisticated econometric techniques that rely on asymptotic 
methods. I am particularly afraid that the nature of estimated VAR system for the post-Asian crisis 
sample might be dominated by the effect of volatile oil price movements toward the end of the sample 
period as documented in Figure 1 of their paper. 
 
Even though the small sample size imposes serious constraints, Lee and Song have presented a 
worthy analysis of the issues addressed in their paper using the tools employed. As a conclusion to the 
first half of the paper, the authors argue that the persistent increase of the oil price in the 2000s is 
induced by the increase in demand for oil, in contrast with the oil price fluctuations in the pre-crisis 
period that are mostly caused by supply-side disturbances. While this conclusion seems reasonable, 
their VAR analysis obviously suffers because of the limited sample size. For example, in Figure 5, 
impulse response functions of most of the variables exhibit rather unusual wave shapes. I suspect that 
this reflects the effect of wild fluctuations of the oil price in 2008 and 2009. A related minor point is 
that because the authors included the interest rate variable, which is available only for the period after 1987, in their VAR analysis, their pre-crisis sample does not contain important information about the 
first and second oil crisis episodes. Therefore, we have to be particularly careful in interpreting the 
VAR results presented here. 
 
I also have some comments on the DSGE results. First, while the relative size of the price stickiness 
parameters makes sense, I am not very comfortable with the fact that the estimated wage stickiness 
parameter (0.539) is lower than any other price stickiness parameters, even lower than oil price 
stickiness (0.685). The result is even more surprising with pre-crisis estimates, with the wage 
stickiness parameter being 0.149 and the oil price stickiness parameter being 0.464. I hope that the 
authors provide some discussion about this problem. 
 
Second, in simulating the effects of different monetary policy rules in Table 6, they use five 
benchmark values (10
thPer, -Mode, Zero, Mode, 90thPer) for πnon. However, why is the negative 
value of the mode (-Mode) used? Is there any justification for this, or has any previous study used this 
value? 
 
Third, from the simulation results reported in Table 6, the authors conclude that the monetary 
policy rule, which accommodates oil price inflation, generally works well, except for the case of very 
persistent technology shocks. However, exactly how costly is it for the Central Bank to deviate from 
the optimal policy rule? The numbers reported in Table 6 seem to suggest that the cost might not be 
very large. I would like to see the authors discuss the economic significance of the numbers reported 
in Table 6, as well as their implications for monetary policy in practice. 
 
 